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This volume provides a detailed assessment of the current tax structure in six developing 
countries: Argentina, Brazil, India, Kenya, Korea, and Russia. Each of the six case 
studies lays out the current statutory provisions, how they have evolved over time, the 
resulting changes in tax revenue, and the key fiscal pressures faced currently looking 
forward.1 The volume includes in addition two overview papers that reassess the 
conventional wisdom about the appropriate design of tax policy in developing countries. 
 As is seen from Table 1, these six countries include some of the poorest and some 
of the richest among developing countries. As of 2004, per capita GDP in Korea and 
Russia was well over $10,000, in Argentina and Brazil it was a bit under $4,000, while 
India’s per capita income was only $695 and Kenya’s only $469. 
 Populations also differ dramatically. India's population is over a billion, Brazil is 
the next largest with a population of 182 million, while Korea, Argentina, and Kenya are 
all roughly a quarter as large. The countries cover all parts of the globe. The three largest 
of these countries have a federal system of governments, while in the remaining three 
countries the national government plays a dominant role.   
 The tax systems in these countries, while largely typical of those in other 
developing countries, are strikingly at odds with the conventional wisdom in the public 
finance literature for the optimal design of a country's tax structure. To begin with, the 
public finance literature at least since Mirrlees (1971) focuses heavily on the optimal rate 
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structure under the personal income tax as a means of best trading off equity and 
efficiency considerations in the collection of tax revenue. Reflecting this focus in the 
academic literature, the personal income tax is typically the main source of tax revenue 
among developed economies.2  As seen in Table 1, though, the personal income tax plays 
little role in any of these six countries. The presumption must be that the countries are not 
in a position to monitor enough of the income accruing to each individual to make an 
income tax a feasible option.   
 These countries do collect a quarter to a fifth of their tax revenue with a value-
added tax, a tax also used heavily among developed countries. Since the VAT (Value 
Added Tax) is a proportional tax without any exemptions for the poor, though, developed 
countries tend to supplement use of the VAT with more generous social safety-net 
programs. While not a focus of this volume, developing countries including these six 
largely do not have equivalent such safety-net programs, leaving more of a tax burden on 
the poor with a VAT than with an income tax.   
 The optimal taxation literature also recommends equal tax rates on all forms of 
consumption, as seen for example in Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976).3 Developing countries 
have over time been replacing excise taxes, where rates often varied dramatically by 
good, with a VAT with one or at least only a few rates. The effective rates, though, are 
low due to a combination of exempt (or zero-rated) goods and evasion. As seen using the 
figures in Table 1, for example, the effective VAT rate (VAT revenue as a fraction of 
consumption) varies from 4 percent in Russia to 12 percent in Brazil.  
 One other standard result from the optimal tax literature is that a small open 
economy should take full advantage of any gains from trade, and not distort trade 
 2
patterns. As seen in Table 1, tariffs are a significant source of revenue, except in Brazil 
and Korea. The papers provide some indication, though, that these tariffs may be serving 
to offset differential tax rates across domestic industries, with higher tariff rates in 
industries where domestic firms face higher domestic tax rates. To this extent, these 
tariffs may lessen rather than exacerbate trade distortions.   
 The optimal taxation literature also concludes that a country that is small relative 
to the world capital market should not distort international flows of capital. Yet we see in 
these countries that the corporate income tax is an important source of tax revenue, 
collecting on average even more than do personal income taxes.4  
 Another striking characteristic of the tax structures in these six countries is the 
low tax revenue relative to GDP. Here, Brazil is an outlier, with government revenue 
equal to 35 percent of GDP, a figure approaching those seen among some richer 
countries. The next highest among this group of countries is Korea with revenue equal to 
25 percent of GDP, while India collects only 15 percent of GDP in tax revenue. While the 
revenue figures for Brazil (and to some extent Argentina) have been growing over time, 
in most of these countries tax revenue has not changed much as a fraction of GDP during 
the past twenty years.   
 These low tax revenue figures do not seem to reflect countries choosing relatively 
low tax rates.5  For example, top personal tax rates are now around 30 percent in these 
countries, VAT rates range from 10 percent in Korea to around 27 percent in Brazil, 
while corporate tax rates among these countries range from 25 percent in Brazil to 35 
percent in Argentina.6 
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 The key difference in the fiscal situation faced in these and other developing 
economies, compared with the situation among developed economies, is much greater 
difficulties in tax administration and enforcement. Partly the problem is that many firms 
can evade tax entirely, operating in the informal economy. Table 1 reports estimates from 
Schneider (2005) of the size of the shadow economy in these six economies, as a fraction 
of GDP.7  The estimated size of the informal economy ranges from a quarter to a half of 
GDP. 
 In addition, even firms that are part of the formal economy can easily understate 
their tax base.  The papers provide many examples of such techniques. Among them:  
Sales can occur in cash, leaving no paper trail. Under the VAT, firms can claim that 
goods were exported (in order to qualify for a zero tax rate) even if the goods never left 
the country or were quickly smuggled back into the country for resale. Firms can 
exaggerate expenses using fake invoices.  Firms can use transfer prices to shift profits or 
value-added into a firm that then disappears without paying the associated taxes, or at 
least into a firm subject to a lower tax rate. Effective tax rates as a result can be much 
below the statutory tax rates, 8 and can vary dramatically by industry9 and by size of firm.   
 Attempts by governments to aid certain sectors have in practice opened up further 
evasion opportunities. The Russian government, given its lack of direct assistance to 
invalids, tried to provide indirect aid by granting a tax exemption to firms where invalids 
constituted at least 50 percent of the employees. This encouraged some of the most 
profitable capital-intensive firms to put just enough invalids on the books to qualify for 
this tax exemption. Both India and Russia grant tax preferences to firms located in 
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particular regions. In response, firms can set up a subsidiary in such regions and use 
transfer pricing in order to report most of its profits (or value-added) there.10    
 Surprisingly, perhaps, none of the papers mention capital flight. Perhaps 
reflecting this threat, however, many of these countries have very low effective tax rates 
on income from financial assets.   
 With evasion such a dominant issue, countries face additional pressures to lower 
tax rates, in order to draw firms into the formal economy and to reduce the incentives on 
those already in the formal economy to underreport their income or value-added. For 
example, several of these countries use presumptive taxes for smaller firms, with the 
effective tax rate much lower than for larger firms. With lower tax rates reducing evasion 
as well as increasing overall economic activity, it is much more likely that countries have 
the opportunity to reduce tax rates and yet gain revenue on net. For example, India has 
reduced its personal and corporate income tax rates dramatically in recent years, yet 
income tax revenue has doubled as a fraction of GDP. Similarly, Korea reduced its 
effective corporate tax rate from 53 percent to 27 percent, while corporate tax receipts 
doubled as a fraction of GDP.   
 These governments have also pursued a variety of other means to deal with 
enforcement problems. To limit the revenue loss from firms underreporting sales under 
the VAT, for example, several of the papers emphasize that governments are not willing 
to provide cash rebates to firms reporting negative value added, instead requiring firms to 
carry forward these credits to use against future tax liabilities. Yet firms that export a 
sizeable fraction of their output, and firms that have large new investments, would 
legitimately have negative value-added. The restriction preventing rebates then leads to 
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an effective tax rate for these firms exceeding the statutory tax rate. According to the 
paper on Kenya, when firms sell to the government the government directly withholds the 
VAT due on these sales, yet is very slow (at best) to rebate the VAT already paid by 
these firms on inputs they purchased, yielding an effective tax rate much above the 
statutory tax rate. 
 To reduce the attractiveness of using cash as a means of tax evasion, several of 
these countries impose a tax on bank debits (Argentina, Brazil, India, and Korea).11 In 
part, information on these withdrawals also provides information that is helpful in 
locating evading firms. In addition, Korea has created a subsidy to use credit cards, 
presumably hoping to shift transactions to a form that can be monitored and taxed more 
easily.   
 Another approach for lowering tax evasion, emphasized by the paper on India, is 
government control over key firms. The paper reports that 38 percent of the income tax 
revenue and 42 percent of VAT payments come from public enterprises. Similarly, in 
Korea a large fraction of revenue comes from a few large firms, which have incentives to 
cooperate with the government in exchange for easy access to credit and implicit loan 
guarantees.   
 Effective tax rates can also vary from statutory tax rates due to unchecked 
enforcement powers of the tax authorities. When tax officials are given incentives simply 
to collect more revenue, it is not surprising that they do so even beyond what the statutes 
would allow. When officials have such unchecked powers, of course, corruption is 
inevitable. Several of these countries have set up independent tax authorities, in order to 
free the tax authorities from political influence and also from civil service restrictions. 
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Another approach mentioned is to give taxpayers better access to the courts to appeal 
unreasonable assessments.   
 In sum, given the conflicting pressures from evasion and overaggressive 
enforcement, the tax law in practice can have little relationship to the statutory 
provisions. Kenya, for example, reports tax revenue equal to 20 percent of GDP even 
while Eissa and Jack (this volume) estimate that only 30 percent of GDP is part of the 
formal economy so subject to tax. While this suggests that the effective average tax rate 
on the formal sector is around two-thirds, the top statutory income tax rates are only 30 
percent and the top VAT rate is only 16 percent. The papers from Argentina and Brazil 
also suggest that effective tax rates can be extremely high.12   
 This large variation in effective vs. statutory tax rates of course raises serious 
questions about the analysis of tax reforms on the economy. What matter for economic 
activity are effective tax rates. How these vary as statutory tax rates change may not be at 
all clear, raising serious challenges in forecasting the effects of possible tax reforms on 
economic activity or on government tax revenue.    
 One other issue mentioned in the papers for the larger of these countries is fiscal 
federalism. Regional and local governments in these countries commonly have 
responsibility for a substantial fraction of overall government expenditures. Countries in 
response give regional/local governments control over particular taxes, often the VAT. 
However, a VAT is an awkward tax for a regional government, given the administrative 
difficulties of monitoring interregional trade.  
 As a result, these national governments normally help to finance regional and 
local governments. One mechanism of course is direct grants. More common among 
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these countries, though, is a formula allocating some fraction of the revenue from some 
taxes collected by the national government to the region where the taxes were collected. 
India faces particular complications here, since their constitution allocates control of the 
income tax on the nonagricultural sector, the VAT on manufacturing, and taxation of 
services, to the national government and taxes on other sectors to regional and local 
governments. Exempting agriculture from national income taxes in practice creates ample 
opportunities for tax evasion. Trying to create a well-functioning VAT with common 
rates at one stage of production and differential rates on other stages, with workable 
cross-state crediting arrangements, has also proven to be a serious problem.   
 Together these papers suggest that the key problem these countries will face in the 
future is improving tax administration. Effective tax rates vary dramatically across firms 
and individuals in the economy, due both to aggressive enforcement where enforcement 
is easy and extensive evasion where it is not. The result is very high tax rates on a narrow 
tax base and low overall tax revenue. Taxes as a result can be highly distorting even 
while they collect relatively little revenue.   
 How best to improve tax administration of course is a difficult problem, and one 
these papers only touch on. One approach mentioned is to improve the incentives faced 
by tax officials, so that their objective is to enforce the law rather than simply to collect 
revenue. Another is to improve the oversight over these officials, perhaps through the 
courts. The papers also emphasize the importance of improving the quality of information 
available to tax officials. This can be done by sharing information among different tax 
departments (e.g. those overseeing the income tax, the VAT, and customs duties) or 
among tax departments in different regions. It can be done by collecting new information, 
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for example on bank transactions or securities transactions. It can also be done by trying 
to tax activities that are more readily observable, e.g. property sales rather than property 
values. Given the main problems described in these papers, here is where future tax 
reform efforts inevitably will need to focus.   
 Given the results of these six case studies, the volume includes as well two 
overview papers. The first, by Stiglitz, reexamines the merits of relying on a value-added 
tax as a major source of revenue among developing countries. While a VAT may be a 
relatively non-distorting tax in richer countries, the six case studies provide ample 
evidence that a VAT can be highly distorting in poorer countries. The large informal 
sectors in these countries evade the tax entirely, while the formal sector can evade a 
substantial fraction of the tax, e.g. through fake invoicing or income shifting to informal 
firms or other formal firms that face much lower tax rates. Even with this extensive 
evasion in the formal sector, a VAT nonetheless discourages formal activity, and likely 
economic development.  
 The question the paper then asks is how best to reduce these economic costs. One 
recommendation is to tax imports at a rate above the VAT rate. This surtax would still be 
rebated for imports purchased by formal firms, but raises the effective tax rate on the 
informal sector. By reducing the differential tax rates across sectors, economic efficiency 
should increase. 
 The second overview paper by Gordon focuses on the low reported tax revenue in 
developing countries, examining in particular the experiences in China and India. In both 
countries, tax revenue during the initial years of their economic reforms came from a 
narrow tax base facing high tax rates. In the case of China, non-state firms paid little in 
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tax revenue, at least to the national government. In the case of India, national revenue 
came heavily from the manufacturing sector. Services, even though, they generated half 
of GDP, were untaxed.   
 When a country faces such a narrow tax base, with effective rates varying 
dramatically by sector, on second-best grounds a variety of restrictions on economic 
activity may make sense, as described at more length in Gordon and Li (forthcoming). 
Tariffs may serve to offset differential tax rates by sector, whether from excise taxes or 
income taxes. Statutory rates may appropriately vary by sector, with lower rates in 
sectors where it is easier to shift into the informal economy. Restrictions on activity in the 
informal sector, with the evocative mnemonic in India of the "license Raj", can help in 
lessening the degree to which taxes unduly shift activity from the formal to the informal 
sectors.   
 Inflation may serve to inhibit activity in the cash economy. Here, Brazil 
represents a country where substantial inflation in earlier years led not only to an 
expansion of the size of the formal sector but also to a major expansion in the role of the 
financial sector. The resulting improvements in productivity in the financial sector, 
presumably due to learning by doing, kept the financial sector large even after the 
inflation rate fell.   
 The resulting policies favoring the formal sector, and in particular those industries 
facing the highest tax rates, may reduce the immediate efficiency costs due to differential 
tax rates by sector. However, the resulting difficulties faced by firms in the informal 
sector can easily reduce rates of entry, innovation, and growth. The overview paper by 
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Gordon then examines the fiscal implications of the economic reforms undertaken in both 
China and India, in each case reducing dramatically the extent of the "license Raj." 
 The result in each country was a rapid rate of entry, and (more so in China than in 
India) a sharp drop in tax revenue due to the fall in profits in the formal sector resulting 
from the increased competition. Without the prior restrictions, the differential tax rates on 
the formal vs. the informal sector become far more distorting. In spite of the fall in 
revenue, tax rates were cut in order to avoid further undercutting the formal sector.   
 This fall in tax revenue confronted each government with difficult choices: either 
government expenditures must fall or government debt must increase. The fall in 
expenditures can undercut development due to the resulting poor education and 
inadequate infrastructure. The fall also risks increasing political opposition to the 
reforms, since many individuals lose more from the drop in services than they gain from 
the new economic opportunities. Debt, in contrast, allows services to continue but creates 
the risk of a financial crisis if the government does not have the revenue in the future to 
repay the debt. China chose in part to cut services, and in part to finance remaining 
services through user fees. India initially borrowed heavily in order to maintain services, 
but recently has shifted instead to cutting services. To what degree this fall in services 
will undercut growth is yet to be seen. 
 A third alternative is to leave in place some provisions protecting the formal 
sector. Both countries for example maintained a sizeable state-owned sector. Both 
countries also relied on local governments to better monitor and tax smaller firms that 
could not effectively be monitored by the national government. Such provisions, while 
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contrary to the conventional wisdom, may be important in reducing the risks faced when 
undertaking economic reforms.   
 With the immediate loss in current tax revenue from economic reforms, and the 
combined political and financial risks faced due to the resulting loss in tax revenue, 
economic reforms can seem daunting for any government that does not have a long time 
horizon. Problems with tax administration in developing countries not only create 
problems in raising current revenue, as documented at length in the six papers in this 
volume, but also create substantial hurdles when considering the adoption of policies that 
encourage a more rapid rate of economic growth. 
 
<Insert Table 1.1> 
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1 The Russian study more narrowly focuses on the evolution of the value-added tax 
during the past fifteen years, given its complicated history.   
2 In the U.S. as of 2004, for example, the personal income tax together with the payroll 
tax collected 80 percent of Federal tax revenue.   
3 The key assumption is that consumption patterns do not vary by ability levels, even if 
they do vary by labor income.    
4 Among developed economies as a whole, corporate tax revenue on average is under half 
of personal tax revenue, and under a quarter of personal tax revenue in the U.S.   
5 Even when tax rates are low, as they commonly are among these countries for smaller 
firms, this choice seems to be in response to the threat that firms will shift into the 
informal sector if rates were any higher, rather than because the desired size of 
government expenditures is low.  
6 These rates are broadly comparable, for example, to those in the U.S., given that U.S. 
state income and retail sales tax rates together are roughly comparable to the VAT rates 
in these countries.   
7 The comparable figure among OECD countries, again according to Schneider (2005), is 
16.3 percent 
8 The paper for Korea reports estimates that the effective VAT rate is only about 65 
percent of the statutory rate. The paper for Argentina reports comparable figures 
averaging around 30 percent.  
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9 The paper for India includes a table comparing the effective corporate tax rates among 
major corporate groups, and finds rates ranging almost uniformly between 0 percent and 
40 percent.   
10 This apparently was the technique that the Russian firm Yukos used in order to reduce 
its tax obligations.   
11 Bank accounts may shift in response, though, to more informal cooperative banks that 
are not in practice subject to these taxes. 




Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz, J.E.  (1976).  ‘The Design of Tax Structure:  Direct vs. 
Indirect Taxation,’  Journal of Public Economics 6, pp. 55-75. 
 
Gordon, R.H. and Li, W.  (forthcoming). ‘Tax Structures in Developing Countries:  Many 
Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,’  Journal of Public Economics. 
 
Mirrlees, J.A.  (1971).  ‘An Exploration in the Theory of Optimal Income Taxation,’  
Review of Economic Studies  38, pp. 175-208. 
 
Schneider, F.(2005).  ‘Shadow Economies of 145 Countries all over the World:  
Estimation Results over the Period 1999 to 2003,’  mimeo.    
 
